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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein, as e. g., rob-
bery or larceny or burglary or rape.'.
In arriving at some conclusion it is best to divide the "felony"
nmurders into two classes. The first, where the felony relied on is
entirely different in nature from the homicide; the second, where
the felony is some grade of assault and where, of necessity, the line
of demarcation grows indistinct. In the first class are those cases
where the inculpatory facts are susceptible of only one interpretation.
Either the accused was engaged in an independent felony at the time
of the killing or he did not murder at all. Here it is not required
to give more than the single charge of first degree murder.5 In the
second class are those cases where the felony is some degree or
grade of assault. Here the facts are susceptible of varying deduc-
tions and consequently there must be a charge of whatever form and
grade of homicide comportable with the proof and indictment.6
The principal case falls within the second class. Here it was
difficult to say where the first assault ended, and the second began,
or that there were, in fact, two assaults. In such a situation it would
save much trouble and expense for the state to give all six charges;
for, most cases of this kind, proceeding on this theory, are reversed.
7
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF BOARD OF ALDERMEN TO
CHANGE STREET NU-UIBERS-WHEN EQUITY WILL INTERFERE.-
An ordinance of the City of New York passed April 22nd, 1924,
changed the name of two blocks on Fourth Avenue, Manhattan, be-
tween Thirty-second and Thirty-fourth Streets, to Park Avenue, and
directed the borough president to renumber the buildings on the east-
erly added portion of Park Avenue. Until the ordinance directing
the change was passed the street known as Park Avenue extended
from Thirty-fourth -Street, north, 140 feet wide and parked in the
center. The number "One Park Avenue" had been allotted to the
house of the plaintiff Martha W. Bacon, and had been used by her
and previous owners for many years. The block front on the east
side of Fourth Avenue between Thirty-second and Thirty-third Streets
was acquired in 1923 for the defendant corporation, which erected
thereon a large commercial structure which under the old numbering
would be 461-477 Fourth Avenue. Prior to the adoption of the reso-
lution to rename and renumber the two blocks, Fourth Avenue was
a commercial street one hundred feet wide in its entire length, while
Park Avenue was a residential street. Shortly after the purchase
of the property by the defendant corporation, and at its instigation,
a resolution was passed by the Board of Aldermen to widen the
street on which its property fronted and it was subsequently physically
widened so as to bring the east curb in line with the east curb of
Park Avenue north of Thirty-fourth Street. This action was brought
by the plaintiff to have the ordinance passed April 22, 1924, renam-
'People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910).
"People v. Moran, T*upra; People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454,
132 N. E. 147 (1921); People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E.
79 (1927).
'People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 177 N. E. 6 (1906) ; People v.
Spohr, supra; People v. Van Norman, supra.
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ing and renumbering Fourth Avenue between Thirty-second and
Thirty-fourth Streets declared invalid and the proceedings thereunder
enjoined. After a decision for the defendant in the trial court and
pending this appeal, the borough president assigned to the property
of the defendant the number "One Park Avenue" and renumbered
the houses on the east side of Park Avenue between Thirty-fourth
and Thirty-fifth streets, assigning to the plaintiff's property the num-
ber five. On appeal the judgment was reversed. Martha W. Bacon,
et al., v. Hon. Julius Miller, as President of the Borough of Man-
hattan, and One Park Avenue Corporation, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 11,
1927, at 693 (App. Div. 1st Dep't.).
It cannot be denied that the board of aldermen and the borough
president acted under adequate statutory authority in the renaming
and renumbering of the street.' But the authority to act for the
public in such matters, conferred by the people upon public officials,
who are the servants of the people, carries with it the duty of acting
in good faith.2 While a municipality under the police power has
broad and comprehensive rights with reference to many matters,
those rights are based on the theory that the act is a benefit to the
public or is a public necessity. In the instant case no attempt was
made to show either necessity or benefit to the community. The
courts have been careful not to allow the authority of municipal cor-
porations to be used to oppress the inhabitants within their jurisdic-
tions, and for injurious abuses of power and invasions of the legal
rights of persons subject to municipal control there is a remedy in
equity.3 This intervention of equity is demanded in the case of an
arbitrary attempt to take away one man's property and give it to
another where the community does not benefit from and does not
need such action, and courts of equity will give relief in such a
situation.4
NUISANCE-WHAT CONSTITUTEs-RIGHTS OF INFANT TREsPASSER.
-Defendant had been dumping its waste hemp and refuse on the
property of a third party without permission. Its practise had been
to set this waste afire but the refuse was of such nature that the
fire smouldered underneath without the surface indicating it. The
dump was about three hundred feet from the nearest street and not
upon or so near a street that a pedestrian would be injured by
coming in contact with it. A path which skirted the hole about five
feet from its edge had been used by the public for many years.
Plaintiff, an infant of four years, while walking over the dump, and
not using the path, was burned by the hidden fire. He instituted an
action against defendant on the theory that the dump was a nuisance.
Held, plaintiff was a trespasser on the property and the dump being
'Greater New York Charter, § 50 (chapter 466 of the Laws of
1901), as amended by chapter 592 of the Laws of 1916; Greater New
York Charter, § 40; Code of Ordinances of the City of New York, Ch.
23, art. X, § 111.
'Anderson v. The Lord Mayor and Corporation of Dublin, L. R.,
Ireland, vol. 15, 1885-1886, p. 410.
'Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., vol. 4, § 1573, p. 2751.
' N. Y. L. J., Nov. 16, 1927, at p. 776.
